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ABSTRACT 
Like most advances, wireless LAN poses both opportunities and risks. The evolution of wireless 
networking in recent years has raised many serious security issues. These security issues are of great 
concern for this technology as it is being subjected to numerous attacks. Because of the free-space radio 
transmission in wireless networks, eavesdropping becomes easy and consequently a security breach may 
result in unauthorized access, information theft, interference and service degradation. Virtual Private 
Networks (VPNs) have emerged as an important solution to security threats surrounding the use of public 
networks for private communications. While VPNs for wired line networks have matured in both research 
and commercial environments, the design and deployment of VPNs for WLAN is still an evolving field. 
This paper presents an approach to secure IEEE 802.11g WLAN using OpenVPN, a transport layer VPN 
solution and its impact on performance of IEEE 802.11g WLAN. 
KEYWORDS 
WLAN, IEEE 802.11g, VPN, Performance evaluation, Security. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Among the various wireless technologies, Wireless LAN (WLAN) comes out as a popular local 
solution because of its features like mobility, easy to setup, low cost and handiness. WLAN 
offers wireless Internet and Intranet access to users in various restricted geographical places 
known as hotspots such as airports, hotels, Internet cafes and college campuses. IEEE 802.11 a, 
b and g are the well known and established standards for WLAN. The IEEE 802.11g WLAN 
technology is one of the fastest growing segment of the communications market today. It 
provides always-on network connectivity without, of course, requiring a network cable. Home 
or remote workers can set up networks without worrying about how to run wires through houses 
that never were designed to support network infrastructure. WLAN components plug into the 
existing infrastructure as simply as extending a phone line with a wireless phone. By removing 
the need to wire a network in the home, the cost of adoption and benefit of mobility within the 
home and the low cost of components make wireless networking a low-cost and efficient way to 
install a home network. But many users of WLAN technology are not aware or concerned about 
the security implications associated with wireless networks. On the other hand, wireless 
adoption within the corporate and medium-sized businesses has been severely inhibited by 
security concerns associated with sending sensitive corporate data over the air. Unlike its wired 
network counterpart, where the data remains in the cables, the wireless network uses open air as 
a medium. This broadcast nature of WLAN introduces a greater risk from intruders. 
In particular, with the evolution of wireless networking in recent years has raised the serious 
security issues [1], [2]. These security issues are of great concern for this technology as it is 
being subjected to numerous attacks [3], [4], and [5]. The most common attacks on wireless 
LANs are unwanted or automatic connection to the wrong network, man-in-the-middle attack 
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with a fake Access Point (AP), theft of information by illegal tapping of the network, intrusion 
from open air, scrambling of the WLAN and consumption of device batteries.  
The Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is a standard security mechanism for IEEE 802.11g 
WLAN. When it was introduced, it was considered as a secured algorithm. But later it was 
found that it can be cracked easily [3], [6], [7], and [8]. VPN technology has been used 
successfully to securely transmit data in wired networks especially when using Internet as the 
medium. This success of VPN in wired networks and the inherent security limitations of 
wireless networks have prompted developers and administrators to deploy it in case of wireless 
networks. A VPN works by creating a tunnel, on top of a protocol such as IP. In this paper we 
evaluated the impact of OpenVPN [9], transport layer VPN solution, on performance of IEEE 
802.11g WLAN. 
This work is extension of our previous work [10]. The paper is organized in eight sections. 
Following this introductory section we give a brief description of WLAN standards. In the third 
section we explain the WEP weakness and vulnerabilities. The fourth section gives overview of 
VPN technology and its need for WLAN. In the fifth section we explain OpenVPN its working 
and comparison with WEP. The sixth section describes experimental details. The seventh 
section presents the experimental results and their analysis. The eighth section concludes the 
paper. 
2. WIRELESS LAN STANDARDS  
The IEEE 802.11 is a set of standards for wireless local area network (WLAN) computer 
communications in the 2.4, 3.6 and 5 GHz frequency bands [11]. The 802.11a, b, and g 
standards are the most common for home wireless access points and large business wireless 
systems. 
The 802.11a is faster than 802.11b with a data transfer rates up to 54Mbps. As compare to 
802.11b it can support more simultaneous connections and suffers less interference as it 
operates in 5GHz frequency band. However, among the three standards 802.11a has shortest 
range.  
The 802.11b works in 2.4 GHz frequency band and support maximum transfer rate of 11Mbps. 
As compare to 802.11a it uses less expensive hardware and better in penetrating physical 
barriers. It is more susceptible to interference as its working frequency is used by many 
electronic appliances. 
The 802.11g operates in 2.4GHz frequency band with maximum transfer rate of 54Mbps and 
have backward compatibility with 802.11b. Being operated in the 2.4GHz it also susceptible to 
interference. In practical scenario distance coverage by 802.11g is better than 802.11a but 
slightly less than 802.11b. 
 
These WLAN standards are summarised in the Table 1. 
Table 1.  IEEE 802.11 WLAN Standards. 
Parameter 802.11a 802.11b 802.11g 
Maximum operating 
speed 
54 Mbps 11Mbps 54Mbps 
Working frequency 
band 5 GHz 2.4 GHz 2.4 GHz 
Modulation 
technique OFDM DSSS OFDM 
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Maximum indoor 
distance coverage 18 mts 30 mts 30 mts 
Maximum outdoor 
distance coverage 30 mts 120 mts 120 mts 
Remarks No interference ; less 
distance due to high 
frequencies 
Interference from RF 
sources like cordless 
phones 
Interference, 
backwards 
compatible with 
802.11b 
 
3. WIRED EQUIVALENT PRIVACY (WEP)  
The WEP is a privacy protocol specified in IEEE 802.11 to protect the link data transmitted in 
WLAN. It refers to the intent to provide a privacy service to wireless LAN users similar to that 
provided by the physical security inherent in a wired LAN. The WEP encryption uses the RC4 
symmetric stream cipher with 40-bit and 104-bit encryption keys. Although 104-bit encryption 
keys are not specified in the 802.11 standard, many wireless AP vendors support them. 
3.1. Security Issues with WEP 
Security researchers have discovered potential attacks that let malicious users compromise the 
security of WLAN that use WEP [5], [7]. The following is a list of such attacks: 
• Passive attacks to decrypt traffic, based on statistical analysis. 
• Active attacks to inject new traffic from unauthorized mobile stations, based on known 
plaintext. 
• Active attacks to decrypt traffic, based on tricking the access point. 
• Dictionary-building attacks, after analyzing enough traffic on a busy network. 
WEP has been widely criticized for a number of weaknesses [6], [8]: 
• WEP is vulnerable because of relatively short IVs and keys. 
• Authentication messages can be easily forged. 
• IV Reuse Problem: Stream ciphers are vulnerable to analysis when the keystream is 
reused. 
• Integrity Check value Insecurity: WEP uses a CRC for the integrity check. Although the 
value of the integrity check is encrypted by the RC4 keystream, CRCs are not 
cryptographically secure. Use of a weak integrity check does not prevent determined 
attackers from transparently modifying frames. 
• Key Management: The WEP standard does not define any key-management protocol 
and presumes that secret keys are distributed to the wireless nodes by an external key-
management service. 
 
3.2. Tools available for attacking WLAN 
The various popular tools for attacking the WLAN are listed in Table 2. 
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Table 2.  Tools for Attacking WLAN. 
Tool Operating 
System 
Description 
Aircrack [13] 
 
Linux / 
Windows 
It is a WEP key cracking program for use on 802.11 
networks. The primary purpose for the program is to 
recover the unknown WEP key once enough data is 
captured. 
Airpwn [14] 
 
Linux It is a tool for generic packet injection on an 802.11 
network. 
Airsnarf [15] 
 
Linux It is a simple rogue wireless access point setup utility to 
steal usernames and passwords from public Wi-Fi 
hotspots. 
BSD-Airtools [16] 
 
Linux It contains a bsd-based wep cracking application, called 
dweputils. It also contains a AP detection application 
similar to netstumbler (dstumbler) that can be used to 
detect wireless access points and connected nodes, view 
signal to noise graphs etc. 
Dsniff  [17] Linux It is counterpart of NetStumbler 
Dstumbler [18] FreeBSD It is counterpart of NetStumbler 
Fake AP [19] 
 
Linux It generates thousands of counterfeit WLAN access 
points.  
KisMAC [20] MacOS It is a free stumbler application for MacOS X. It puts 
network card into the monitor mode, completely 
invisible and send no probe requests. 
Kismet [21] 
 
 
Linux It passively monitors wireless traffic and dissects frames 
to identify SSIDs, MAC addresses, channels and 
connection speeds. 
MacIdChanger 
[22] 
Windows It is a MAC address spoofing tool. This is generally 
used to conceal the unique MAC id that is on every 
network adapter. 
MacStumbler [23] 
 
MacOS It is a utility to display information about nearby 
802.11b and 802.11g wireless access points. 
Netstumbler  [24] 
 
Windows It is a wireless access point identifier running on 
Windows. 
Wep0ff  [25] 
 
 
Linux / 
Windows 
It is a tool to crack WEP-key without access to AP by 
mount fake access point attack against WEP-based 
wireless clients. 
WEPCrack [26] 
 
Linux It is a tool that cracks 802.11 WEP encryption keys by 
exploiting the weaknesses of RC4 key scheduling. 
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WEPWedgie [27] 
 
 
Linux It is a toolkit for determining 802.11 WEP keystreams 
and injecting traffic with known keystreams. The toolkit 
also includes logic for firewall rule mapping, ping 
scanning, and port scanning via the injection channel 
and a cellular modem. 
Wifitap [28] 
 
Linux It allows users to connect to wifi networks using traffic 
injection. 
4. VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK (VPN) 
VPN technology provides the means to securely transmit data between two network devices 
over an insecure data transport medium.VPN technology has been used successfully in wired 
networks especially when using Internet as the medium. This success of VPN in wired networks 
and the inherent security limitations of wireless networks have prompted developers and 
administrators to deploy it in case of wireless networks. A VPN works by creating a tunnel, on 
top of a protocol such as IP. VPN technology provides three levels of security: 
• Confidentiality: To provide the security against the loss of confidentiality, VPN 
provides a secure tunnel on top of inherently un-secure medium like the Internet. The 
data is encrypted before passing through the tunnel which provides another level of data 
confidentiality. If an attacker manages to get into the tunnel and intercepts the data, that 
attacker will only get encrypted data. 
• Integrity: VPN uses integrity check mechanism such as hashing, message 
authentication code or digital signature to protect against the modification of data. It 
guarantees that all traffic is from authenticated devices thus implying data integrity. 
• Origin Authentication: VPN provides mechanism for origin authentication by using 
cryptographic mechanism such as message authentication code or digital signature. 
• Replay Protection: VPN also provides security against replay attack by using sliding 
window mechanism. 
4.1. Need for VPN in Wireless Networks 
The WLAN did not focus on security as a primary requirement. Generally the main focuses 
were on connectivity, throughput and other architectural and functional issues. As compared to 
wired networking the wireless networking is inherently more prone to attacks and less secure. 
Physical boundary for a wireless network cannot be confined. Although WEP is an existing 
security mechanism for WLAN, researchers have found many vulnerabilities in it. The WEP is 
also subjected to numerous attacks. These security issues of WLAN, lead the researchers, 
vendors and analysts to look for a solution to prevent these attacks.  
The tunnelling of data using VPN technology is a widely agreed robust protection against many 
threats and attacks. 
5. OPENVPN 
The OpenVPN is free and open source user space VPN solution which tunnels the traffic 
through transport layer using TCP or UDP protocol for encapsulation and transfer of data. It 
uses virtual network interface (VNI) for capturing incoming traffic before encryption and 
sending outgoing traffic after decryption. Security in OpenVPN is handled by the OpenSSL [12] 
cryptographic library which provides strong security over Secure Socket Layer (SSL) using 
standard algorithms such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Blowfish, or Triple DES 
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(3DES). The OpenVPN uses a mode called Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) which makes the 
cipher text of the current block dependent on the cipher text of the previous block. This prevents 
an attacker from seeing patterns between blocks with identical plaintext messages and 
manipulating one or more of these blocks. 
The VNI appears as actual network interface to all applications and users. Packets of incoming 
traffic sent via a VNI are delivered to a user-space program attached to the VNI. A user-space 
program may also pass packets into a VNI. In this case the VNI injects these packets to the 
operating system network stack to sends it to the location mentioned in destination address field 
of the packets. The TUN and TAP are open source VNI. The TAP simulates an Ethernet device 
and it operates with layer 2 packets such as Ethernet frames. The TUN simulates a network 
layer device and it operates with layer 3 packets such as IP packets [29, 30].  
In Figure 1, the working of OpenVPN is explained and in Figure 2, the data flow in OpenVPN 
environment is shown. 
 
Figure 1.  OpenVPN Tunnel between two end points 
 
Figure 2.  OpenVPN – Data Flow 
The OpenVPN performs the following to secure the communications: 
• Receives the packets of outgoing plain traffic from user space program by using the 
VNI. 
• After receiving the packets, it compresses the received packets using Lempel-Ziv-
Oberhumer (LZO) compression. 
• After compression, it encrypts the packets using OpenSSL cryptographic library. For 
our experimentation we are using AES-128. 
• OpenVPN also applies sliding window method to provide replay protection. 
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• Then it tunnels the packet using UDP or TCP protocol to the other end. 
• On receiving the encrypted traffic at other end, the OpenVPN performs the reverse of 
cryptographic operations to verify integrity, authenticity etc. 
• After successful completion of reverse cryptographic operations, it decompresses the 
packet. 
• The decompressed packet is then passed via VNI to the user space program. 
5.1. OpenVPN Cryptographic Operation 
• OpenVPN uses a security model designed to protect against both passive and active 
attacks.  
• OpenVPN security model is based on using SSL/TLS for session authentication and the 
IPSec ESP protocol for secure tunnel transport over UDP. 
• OpenVPN uses the X509 PKI (public key infrastructure) for session authentication. 
• OpenVPN uses TLS protocol for cryptographic key exchange. 
• OpenVPN uses two factor authentication for authenticate the clients. 
• OpenVPN uses OpenSSL cipher-independent EVP, an OpenSSL API that provides 
high-level interface to cryptographic functions, for encrypting tunnel data. 
• OpenVPN uses HMAC-SHA1 algorithm for authenticating tunnel data. 
5.2. Overcoming WEP vulnerabilities  
In Table 3 shows how OpenVPN overcomes the WEP vulnerabilities by comparing it with WEP 
on various parameters. 
Table 3.  OpenVPN Comparison with WEP. 
Parameter WEP OpenVPN Remark 
Initialisation  
Vector (IV) 
24 bit  
(Too small) 
Cipher –dependent and 
equal to cipher block 
size. 
OpenVPN solves the IV 
reuse problem of WEP. 
Encryption 
Algorithm 
RC4 stream 
cipher 
All Block Cipher 
supported by 
OpenSSL. Ex. AES, 
Blowfish, DES etc. 
Encryption is fast and more 
secure in OpenVPN. 
CBC Mode Not supported Supported OpenVPN protects against 
know plain text attack. 
Authentication Open system 
and shared 
secret 
authentication 
TLS based two factor 
authentication 
OpenVPN authentication is 
strong than WEP. 
Data 
Authentication 
and Integrity 
check 
By using 
Cyclic 
Redundancy 
Check (CRC) 
All OpenSSL 
authentication 
mechanism like 
HMAC-SHA1, MD5 
etc. 
OpenVPN provides better 
data authentication and 
integrity check. 
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Key 
Management 
No key 
management 
PKI X509 and pre 
shared secret 
OpenVPN supports two 
established key 
management. 
Replay 
Protection 
No Yes OpenVPN uses sliding 
window mechanism to 
provide replay protection. 
Attacks: Bit 
flipping, 
dictionary-
building, FMS, 
etc. 
Vulnerable to 
these attacks 
[5], [7], [8] 
Secure against these 
attacks 
OpenVPN provide security 
against well known WEP 
attacks.  
6. EXPERIMENT SETUP FOR PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
For analyzing the impact of OpenVPN on performance of IEEE 802.11g WLAN we created two 
experiment scenarios. First was for measuring the throughput under normal conditions and the 
second was to analyze the variation of traffic throughputs over an IEEE 802.11g WLAN when 
OpenVPN is implemented in WLAN. The following parameters were used as metrics for 
performance measurement during our experiments: 
• Throughput is the rate at which bulk of data transfers can be transmitted from one host 
to another over a sufficiently long period of time. 
• Latency is the total time required for a packet to travel from one host to another, 
generally from a transmitter through a network to a receiver.  
• Frame loss is measured as the frames transmitted but not received at the destination 
compared to the total number or frames transmitted. 
• IP Packet delay variation is measured for packets belonging to the same packet stream 
and shows the difference in the one-way delay that packets experience in the network. 
6.1. Standard followed for performance measurement 
We followed the IP Performance Metrics (IPPM) RFC 4148 [31], to measure the performance. 
The following is the list of metrics we have used along with the standard followed to measure 
these metrics. 
• Maximum throughput achieved as per RFC 2544 [32], 
• One-way Delay as per RFC 2679 [33], 
• One-way Packet Loss as per RFC 2680 [34], 
• IP Packet Delay Variation Metric as per RFC 3393 [35]. 
6.2. Requirements for Experimentation  
The following is a list of the general Software and Hardware requirements for our experiments:  
• Two laptops loaded with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, 
• Ethernet Cables, 
• TL-WA601G 108M TP-Link Wireless Access point, 
• SPT-2000A Spirent test center. 
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6.3. Experiment Setup 
In our experiment setup two laptops are connected using TP-Link Access point. The distance 
between the AP and the laptops is set to 4 meters to keep the signal strength high. Port-1 of 
Spirent test center is connected to laptop-1 and port-2 of Spirent is connected to laptop-2 using 
Ethernet cables of length 3 meters. These ports act as clients for laptops. These ports are used 
for traffic generation and analysis purpose. Port-1 of Spirent test center is used to generate the 
desired traffic for various data rates, frame sizes etc. Port-2 receives the traffic and analyses it. 
The analysis includes max throughput achieved, latency and packet delay variation with respect 
to various frame sizes. The 802.11g WLAN standard does not have inbuilt compression feature. 
OpenVPN supports both modes without compression and with compression, in our study we 
experimented both modes. 
6.3.1. Performance without OpenVPN 
The experiment setup for this is shown in Figure 3. We carried out this experiment for 
measuring the baseline performance of IEEE 802.11g WLAN. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Experiment setup without OpenVPN 
This experiment comprises of two steps. The first step measures the throughput with respect to 
UDP traffic, while the second step measures the throughput with respect to TCP traffic. In the 
first step, port-1 of Spirent test center sends UDP traffic of different frame sizes to laptop-1, 
which is connected to laptop-2 through wireless link using an Access Point (AP). Laptop-1 
forwards this data to laptop-2 through AP and then laptop-2 send this data to port-2 of the 
Spirent test center. The second step of the experiment was conducted using the same 
environment variables described above, but this time TCP traffic was generated using port-1 to 
send traffic with different frame sizes from laptop1 to laptop2. We varied the size of the frame 
from 512 bytes to 1518 bytes. 
6.3.2. Performance with OpenVPN 
Now our next aim is to analyze the impact of applying OpenVPN security solution to 802.11g 
WLAN. In this scenario first we have to run our OpenVPN solution on both the laptops. 
OpenVPN configuration files [36] for both laptops are given below in Table 4. 
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Table 4.  OpenVPN configuration files. 
Configuration file – Laptop-1 Configuration file – Laptop-2 
Port 5002 
Proto udp 
Dev tun0 
Remote 192.168.1.102 
Ifconfig 20.20.20.1 20.20.20.2 
Cipher AES-128-CBC 
Secret static.key 
Comp-lzo 
Keepalive 5  20 
Persist-tun 
Port 5002 
Proto udp 
Dev tun0 
Remote 192.168.1.100 
Ifconfig 20.20.20.2 20.20.20.1 
Cipher AES-128-CBC 
Secret static.key 
Comp-lzo 
Keepalive 5  20 
Persist-tun 
The setup for this experiment is shown in Figure 4. To analyze the impact of applying 
OpenVPN security to 802.11g WLAN on the throughput of UDP and TCP traffic in IEEE 
802.11g WLAN, we performed the experiments in two steps. In first step we measured the 
impact on UDP traffic over IEEE 802.11g and in second step we measured the impact on TCP 
traffic over IEEE 802.11g. Experimentation was carried out in the same manner as for baseline 
performance measurement. 
 
Figure 4.  Experiment setup with OpenVPN 
7. EXPERIMENT RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
The results for all test scenarios of our experiment were collected from the test bed illustrated in 
the experiment setup section. Each experiment was repeated for twenty iterations to find the 
average performance values. 
7.1. Throughput 
The UDP and TCP throughput are measured as per RFC 2544 standards for different frame 
sizes. The results of these experiments for UDP are presented in Table 5 and in Figure 5. The 
results of these experiments for TCP are presented in Table 6 and in Figure 6.  
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Table 5.  UDP throughput results. 
Frame 
Size 
(bytes) 
UDP Average Throughput (Mbps) 
Without 
OpenVPN 
With OpenVPN 
Without compression With compression 
512 3.847 3.627 5.429 
1024 5.429 4.574 11.238 
1280 6.062 5.389 13.915 
1518 6.906 6.062 16.09 
Table 6.  TCP throughput results. 
Frame 
Size 
(bytes) 
TCP Average Throughput (Mbps) 
Without 
OpenVPN 
With OpenVPN 
Without compression With compression 
512 3.135 2.601 4.796 
1024 4.796 4.065 10.929 
1280 5.429 4.961 12.936 
1518 6.062 5.62 16.09 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 indicates that the throughput increases for both UDP and TCP traffic with 
increased frame size. Throughput increases because when the data transmitted using large 
frames the total overhead for transmitting the data due to frame headers will be less as compare 
to when the data is transmitted using small frames. The throughput is decreased slightly when 
OpenVPN is applied because of the increased overhead which is due to encapsulation and 
cryptographic operations used by OpenVPN. When compression is used with OpenVPN 
throughput increases since compression reduces the packet size in physical interface. 
Throughput in this case is better than the throughput in normal case i.e. without OpenVPN 
because IEEE 802.11g does not has inbuilt compression and after compression packet size 
reduces considerably if data is not randomly distributed which is true most of the time. 
 
Figure 5.  UDP throughput according to frame size. 
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Figure 6.  TCP throughput according to frame size. 
As mentioned above, throughput of WLAN decreases slightly for both UDP and TCP traffic 
after applying OpenVPN security. Table 7 lists the decrease in throughput corresponding to 
each frame size and for UDP and TCP traffic. From the table it is clear that maximum decrease 
in throughput is 15.84% (0.86 Mbps) in case of UDP traffic. In case of TCP traffic the 
maximum decrease in throughput is 16.91% (0.53Mbps). 
Table 7.  Loss in throughput after applying OpenVPN without compression 
Frame Size 
(bytes) 
UDP TCP 
Loss (Mbps) Loss % Loss (Mbps) Loss % 
512 0.22 5.72 0.53 16.91 
1024 0.86 15.84 0.73 15.22 
1280 0.67 11.05 0.47 8.66 
1518 0.84 12.16 0.44 7.26 
7.2. Average latency 
We measured the average latency as per RFC 2679 standards for both UDP and TCP traffic 
with various frame size. Figure 7 and Figure 8 shows the experimental result for average 
latency. The figures clearly indicate that the latency increases for both UDP and TCP traffic as 
we increase the frame size. This is due to the fact that round trip time is proportional to the size 
of frame. From these figures it is also clear that latency is less for normal case as compare to the 
two cases of OpenVPN mode because in OpenVPN mode additional processing is required for 
performing cryptographic operation, compression and encapsulation. From the experiment 
results we also analyzed that the latency in case of OpenVPN without compression is more than 
in case of OpenVPN with compression. Even though compression takes some processing time it 
reduces the frame size which results in decreased transmission time as compare to the 
transmission time when frame is not compressed. 
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Figure 7. UDP Average Latency according to frame size. 
 
Figure 8.  TCP Average Latency according to frame size. 
7.3. Frame Loss Percentage 
Frame Loss Percentage is measured as per RFC 2680 standards for UDP and TCP traffic with 
different loads. The results of these experiments are presented in Figure 9 and Figure 10. These 
figures indicate that as we increase the load the Frame Loss Percentage increases for both UDP 
and TCP traffic. The frame loss percentage increases exponentially as the load crosses the 
throughput value corresponding to particular frame size. 
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Figure 9.  UDP Frame Loss Percentage according to frame size. 
 
Figure 10.  TCP Frame Loss Percentage according to frame size. 
7.4. IP Packet Delay Variation 
The IP Packet delay variation is measured as per RFC 3393 standards for UDP traffic for 
different frame size with different transmission rates. The result of this experiment is presented 
in Figure 11. This figure indicates that as we increase the load the IP Packet delay variation 
increases. From the above figures we observe that with the use of compression with OpenVPN, 
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the IP Packet delay variation decreased as compared to normal case because compression 
reduces the payload size of packet. 
 
Figure 11.  TCP Frame Loss Percentage according to frame size. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The benefit of wireless networks is driving the explosive growth of the WLAN market, where 
security has been the single largest concern for wireless network deployment. Through this 
paper we discuss why security is a major concern for WLAN. We have investigated and listed 
security vulnerabilities and attacks on the standard security mechanism for WLAN called WEP. 
We also explained how VPN can be used as a security solution for WLAN. In this work a 
transport layer tunneling based VPN solution named OpenVPN was adopted and implemented 
for 802.11g WLAN. To show how OpenVPN overcomes the weaknesses of WEP, we have 
compared OpenVPN with WEP based on various security parameters. The performance analysis 
was carried out with respect to throughput, latency, frame loss and IP packet delay variation. To 
measure these performance matrices we have followed RFC4148, RFC 2544, RFC 2679, RFC 
2680 and RFC 3393. Experimentation was carried out for both UDP and TCP traffic with 
respect to various data rates and frame sizes using Spirent test center to analyse the impact of 
OpenVPN on performance of 802.11g WLAN. From the experimental results we can conclude 
that there is slight decrease in performance of 802.11g WLAN with the implementation of 
OpenVPN. But there is an increase in the performance of 802.11g WLAN with the use of 
compression in OpenVPN. 
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